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ABSTRACT 
 
In studying causation, many examples are presented assuming that determinism 
holds in the world of the example such as the notoriously difficult to resolve 
preemptive and preventative situations.  We show that for deterministic examples 
that this conditional preemptive situation is either (i) vacuously true, (ii) 
contradictory, or (iii) implies indeterminism.  Along the way we formulate a specific 
block space-time definition of determinism, and suggest that commonsense 
causation theories need focus on unphysical quantities and indeterminism. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
     The examples used to demonstrate the inadequacies of various theories of causality have been 
enormously helpful in shaping our view of cause and effect.  Just like proceeding in physics, for 
instance, in philosophical debates one develops a theory to try and explain our notion of cause and 
effect in clearer terms.  This theory is then put to the test by exposing it to a collection of critical 
thinkers, many of whom create hypothetical situations (thought experiments or gedanken) that 
expose potential flaws in the theory.  In general, if a logical or commonsense contradiction is 
suggested, then either the theory must be abandoned or reformulated.  The process repeats with a 
new theory and the hope that the new theories are progressing toward a formulation that can stand 
up better to various thought experiments.   
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     While it is important to analyze the theory and understand exactly where the contradiction arises 
with respect to the particular thought experiment, it is also important to analyze the thought 
experiment to make sure that it does not include any presuppositions or inherent contradictions that 
would otherwise confuse any comparison of theory to thought experiment.  To this goal, we will 
examine the wording and premises of one particular example in depth.  We will suggest that the 
conclusions drawn from this example extend to other examples of the same form.  I worry that 
some of the discussion will sound of needless semantic arguments that do not have any real 
relevance to the problem at hand.  However, the incompatibility that I am attempting to expose 
seems to be subtle in that it has not been addressed before. 
 
II. EARLY CONFUSION 
     The problem involves posing a causation situation in a deterministic world, and then proposing 
an alternative situation at the end of the example whose realization contradicts the events that 
supposedly occurred in that deterministic world.  Our canonical example will be that of so-called 
late-preemption.  In these sorts of thought experiments, the conditional situation is assumed to be 
true a priori in the sense that it is defined to be true according to the set-up of the example; one 
does not need to apply any procedure to derive its truth.  This conditional is essentially a 
counterfactual that is defined to be true in the world of the thought experiment.  We will show that 
for deterministic examples, this conditional is either (i) vacuously true, and adds nothing to the 
example, (ii) requires us to consider a completely different world whose analysis creates a 
contradiction, or (iii) implies indeterminism.  In this paper we will first draw an analogy to a word 
problem in algebra that has essentially the same form as a causation example and show that (i) or 
(ii) must follow from this example.  We then explain the misunderstanding in causation examples 
as arising from an unspecified perspective.  In the last part we question the meaning of determinism 
and provide an unambiguous definition that potentially eliminates the above confusion and shows 
that the traditional deterministic example of late-preemption is better considered a poorly specified 
indeterministic example.  Before we begin let us look at an early example. 
     It appears that confusion regarding a deterministic causation example can be seen in Lewis’s 
influential 1973 paper on counterfactual causation (Lewis [1973]).  In this work, Lewis defines 
determinism as:  
 
“The prevailing laws of nature are such that there do not exist any two possible worlds which are exactly alike 
up to some time, which differ thereafter, and in which those laws are never violated”  
 
He then acknowledges that he will be ignoring indeterminism in that work, although he goes on to 
discuss a preemption example and states, “Suppose that c1 occurs and causes e; and that c2 also 
occurs and does not cause e, but would have caused e if c1
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working in a deterministic world, and we do not explicitly acknowledge that there may be 
indeterminism in this example in the form of probability or otherwise, it seems that under no 
circumstance could c1 ever be absent.  What sort of determinism allows events to go one way or 
the other?  In the language above, are we to assume that before event c1, there were a set of 
possible worlds that were precisely identical in state and natural law, but in some way right before 
some time, event c1 had the opportunity to occur or not in these identical worlds?  This sounds 
much more like an example of indeterminism, or at least it does not fit the definition of 
determinism above.  Perhaps c1 being absent does refer to a completely different world; a different 
world where determinism also holds, but how could this totally different world have anything to do 
with the causal situation in the world I care about?  In one world c1 always occurs; in the other it 
never occurs, yet these possible worlds never influence each other.  If that were not confusing 
enough, somehow we also know that c2 deterministically would have caused e without a doubt.   
Given that this these sorts of examples flourish in counterfactual theories of causation under 
determinism, it seems important to clarify the state of affairs. 
 
III. PREEMPTION WITH BILLY AND SUZY 
     We will now discuss in more length the popular example of late preemption given by Hall 
(2002) which goes essentially as follows – Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a window. Suzy throws 
first so that her rock arrives first and shatters the glass. Without Suzy's throw, Billy's throw would 
have shattered the window.  Late preemptive examples like this one have been useful for 
understanding causation because they seem to cause a bit of trouble for many theories.  For 
instance, with regard to Lewis’s 1973 counterfactual theory of causation, it is felt that his theory 
cannot explain the commonsense belief that Suzy caused the shattering, since even if Suzy did not 
throw her rock, Billy would have shattered the glass anyway, and there would have been no causal 
chain connecting Suzy to the shattered window (Menzies [2001]).  Let us look at the pieces. 
 
1) Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a window 
2) Suzy throws first 
3) Suzy’s rock arrives first and shatters the window 
4) If Suzy’s rock hadn’t shattered the window, Billy’s rock would have shattered the window1 
 
     As above, according to Lewis’s old theory, there is no causal dependence between Suzy's throw 
and the shattering, since even if Suzy had not thrown her rock, the window would have shattered 
due to Billy's throw.  Now here the problem arises.  In the analysis we are quick to think that if 
                                                 
1 The first 3 points are rather innocuous, although the third is slightly worrisome in that the verb ‘shatters’ could easily be replaced 
with ‘causes the window to shatter.’  It may be preferable to say “Suzy’s rock arrives first, then the window is found shattered” or 
something like that, so that we do not imply what causes what, although I am just being picky.   
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Suzy did not shatter the window, then Billy would have.  However, our original thought experiment 
mandated determinism, and it states that Suzy’s rock shattered the window.  We do not need even 
consider 4) above because 3) is guaranteed to be true by definition.  If you assume that this is a 
deterministic example, then we are not permitted to ask what if in the everyday sense according to 
this thought experiment, so any analysis that does is nonsensical.  In order to ask what if we require 
a completely new thought experiment or a possibility that 3) is not true.  While you may argue that 
one can conceive of a possible world in which Suzy does not shatter the window, we will show that 
any argument that demands us to consider such an alternate world in order to draw a conclusion 
about causation creates a logical contradiction under determinism.  
     So why are we so quick to ask what if in this thought experiment even though we take it as a 
deterministic example?  The easy answer would be say that it is not a deterministic example, or to 
acknowledge that even though the world of the example is deterministic, we act as though it is not.  
But I do not think this is the reason, and the writers of these examples have not hinted at 
probabilities for the alternative outcomes.  I believe it is the language of possible worlds and 
counterfactuals that has somehow diluted the meaning of determinism.  In a deterministic world, 
events can happen in only one way. 
 
IV. COMPARISON TO ALGEBRA 
      We can readily make a comparison between causation thought experiments and word problems 
in basic algebra.   It seems natural to compare the word problem, a set of propositions, to the 
thought experiment in a typical causation example.  Further, a particular theory of causation, in 
other words, a rule for taking a thought experiment and computing the truth of a causal event can 
be compared to the arithmetic rules or theorems of algebra.  Consider the following mathematical 
word problem: 
 
Billy and Suzy both run a 100 meter race.   Each runner runs at the same constant velocity.  Suzy starts 
slightly before Billy.  However, had Suzy not started before Billy, Billy would have started before Suzy.  Who 
will finish the race first?    
 
     This is not much of a word problem, but clearly by the rules of algebra coupled with implicit 
notions of length and velocity, we calculate that Suzy will finish the race first.  Of course I can ask, 
“Well, what if Billy started before Suzy?”  Then again, by the rules of algebra, I calculate that Billy 
would have won under that new premise.  However, at no time do I consider both examples 
simultaneously and attempt to answer the question as to whom will win the race.  Nor can I use 
conclusions from the latter to make arguments against the former.  Considering both thought 
experiments simultaneously would be like following example.  Billy and Suzy both run a 100 meter 
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race.  Each runner runs at the same velocity.  Suzy starts before Billy.  Billy starts before Suzy.  
Who will finish the race first? 
     Of course this question is trivially nonsense. The theorems of algebra cannot resolve this 
problem ‘en bloc’ because the problem is logically inconsistent.   Symbolically, if A  is the theorem 
of algebra (coupled to notions of length and velocity) and   and  are sets of premises in the 
form of word problems, the first with Suzy starting first and the second with Billy first; then both 
 and have answers.  However, 
1H 2H
( 1HA ) )( 2HA ( )21HHA
21HH
 cannot be resolved – not because the 
theorems of algebra are deficient but because , which has Suzy and Billy both starting first, 
does not make sense.  Causation examples are equally troublesome because the conditional premise 
is a logical negation of the original premise.  A theorem of causation must be able to resolve a 
particular thought experiment ‘as is’.  A hypothetical conditional situation is often used as an 
argument to refute a particular theorem of causation.  Again, the typical argument is as follows 
with regard to late preemption – Lewis’s theory of causation suggests that Suzy caused the glass to 
shatter; however, if Suzy missed and Billy’s rock caused the shattering, then Suzy’s actions would 
have no connection to the shattering; therefore, Lewis’s theory cannot be correct.  This argument 
carries no weight for the reasons above.  The detractor is talking about a totally different thought 
experiment.  With regard to the algebra example, it is similar to arguing that the theorem of algebra 
cannot be correct because, if Billy started before Suzy, then Billy would have been first; but we 
have already calculated that Suzy finished first, so algebra is not correct.  We cannot posit both 
worlds and apply the theory en bloc.   
     In considering other possible hypothetical worlds; specifically, worlds which logically 
contradict the truth value of the original thought experiment, we create a contradiction at the level 
of the thought experiment itself.   In symbolic form, if T  represents a theory of causation,   
represents a thought experiment with a specific set of premises and  represents another thought 
experiment with a different set of premises espoused in the conditional scenario, then our theorem 
must apply simultaneously to the premises of both  and , represented as T .  
However, quite often  creates a logical contradiction under analysis, e.g. Suzy shatters the 
window and Billy shatters the window.  While one may argue that at no time T  is the case, 
and that  T  is the focus of analysis, this would imply that the theory could resolve causation 
questions for  and  independently, and at no point would we need to posit the alternate 
world.  Another way out would be to say that we really are considering 
1H
2H
1H 2H ( )21HH
( 21HH
21HH
2H
)
)( 1H
1H ( ))() 21 HT(H2 TT , where 
 is another theory and that  T  and 2T ( 1H ) ( )2HT  do not contradict each other; however, no theorist 
has suggested that this strategy is being undertaken.  Perhaps we are to assume that the conditional 
situation in a causation example has a unique meaning that differs from the sense in the word 
problem?  I do not see an obvious difference, and if one exists it has not been clarified. 
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     The implication here, if we are to accept the preceding argument, is that under determinism the 
conditional counterfactual statement at the end of each thought experiment above is either 
completely irrelevant to the problem or creates a logical contradiction in further analysis.  How is it 
then that numerous modern causation examples have been analyzed in this manner and no one has 
seen any problem?  Perhaps the writers did not really mean to say that the examples were 
deterministic – but then they should have mentioned something about the likelihood of the 
opposing events.  Maybe there are other implicit assumptions within causation thought experiments 
that are typically made that I have not presumed or vice versa.    
 
V. A LAYERING OF PERSPECTIVE 
     I believe one source of conflict arises in viewing the thought experiment as a set of events that 
actually took place within the actual physical world, rather than viewing it as an abstraction of 
information divorced from all other knowledge.  In the latter view, we could replace the words 
‘Suzy’ and ‘shatters’ with letters such as C and E, and no information would be lost from the 
original example.  In the former case, if I were to replace the concept ‘Suzy’ with the letter C, I 
would be suffering a great loss of information as I presume that Suzy is a human female with mass, 
a genetic code, and feelings.  Now this is the confusion.  It seems that most causation analyses 
assume the former viewpoint, that the events described in the example take place in the actual 
physical world, and that Suzy does have all of the properties of a human.  My mistake above in 
deriving the contradiction of the conditional world was to assume the latter, that events are pure 
abstractions with no contact to the actual physical world.  Therefore, perhaps the contradiction is 
avoided by assuming that the hypothetical events take place in an actual world, and that ‘Suzy’ and 
‘shatters’ cannot be replaced by abstracted variables. 2 
     Suppose that we are in the backyard of Ms Smith’s house.  Suzy and Billy are standing in the 
yard.  There is a window about 15 feet away from both Suzy and Billy, and you are nearby so that 
you have a good view of them both and the window.  You watch Suzy pull her arm back over her 
shoulder and launch the rock at the window.  At the moment you notice the rock at the window, the 
window shatters with pieces falling to the ground.  You conclude that Suzy’s rock shattered the 
window, although in the actual world such an observation would not be sufficient to prove 
causation.  Nonetheless, after witnessing Suzy’s action you sit back and think, well, if Suzy had not 
shattered the glass, then Billy would have done so anyway.  There are two problems with this 
                                                 
2  If Suzy throwing rocks took place in the actual world, and our thought experiment posits that “Suzy’s rock shattered the glass”, 
then I first must assume that someone observed her throw the rock at some past time, and that this person observed what he saw 
‘correctly’ without confusion and did not miss anything.  Of course he might have seen it incorrectly with some small probability.  
You might like to disagree, and state that we are talking about a hypothetical ‘abstract’ Suzy that doesn’t really exist, and that no 
one really witnessed anything because it’s an abstracted example, then I must question how abstracted is it?  If we are no longer 
talking about actual events in the world, then your example might be subject to the logical contradiction above.  Let us bypass this 
argument by assuming that you actually observe, in the actual world, Suzy throwing a rock at a glass. 
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thinking.  First, as an observer of Suzy in the actual world, for you to wonder if Suzy had not 
shattered the glass requires the possibility that events could have gone a different way.  This 
requires you to specify a probability that Suzy shatters the window.  If you demand that Suzy could 
not have done otherwise, then the probability was equal to 1, and it makes no sense to hypothesize 
what Billy would have done because Suzy was never going to miss.  If you concede that Suzy did 
have a chance, however small, to miss the window then you should specify this probability in the 
thought experiment.  But let us assume that this chance to miss was implied but not specified (I do 
not think this chance is typically implied as determinism is assumed, but it is the only way to save 
the example).  Now the second problem arises once we consider Billy’s actions.  As an observer in 
Billy’s world, you have no way of knowing with absolute certainty that Billy would have indeed 
shattered the window if Suzy missed.  How could you possibly have this information in advance?  
You may have some degree of probability, but it strains logic to assume that you could predict the 
future perfectly.  Is there not some small chance that Billy will miss too?  
     It seems that the typical late preemption example assumes a layering of perspectives within a 
single example – the perspective of hypothetical Suzy and Billy and possible observers at that same 
layer, and the perspective of external observers, us, who can observe the world of Suzy and Billy 
but also observe external truths that they do not have access.  Let us call our perspective the actual 
layer and Suzy’s perspective the example layer.  As residents of the actual layer, you and I have 
full knowledge of the example layer.  The problem arises with the conditional statement usually 
posed at the last line of the example such as “had Suzy missed, Billy’s rock would have shattered 
the glass.”  The common analysis of causation examples assumes that this statement has relevance 
in the example layer, although as we have just shown that unless the antecedent has a possibility of 
being true in that layer, then we need not even consider it as part of the original example.  If you 
maintain that the example is strictly deterministic, then either the conditional statement is irrelevant 
because it resides in the example layer and can never be true in the everyday sense, or you are 
implicitly assuming that the conditional statement resides in the actual layer.   However, if the 
conditional resides in the actual layer, and you assume that the example is deterministic, then any 
use of the conditional will result in the contradiction as in the algebra example above.  It is 
interesting that in the algebraic word problem we distinguish the actual and example layers clearly, 
yet in the causation example we mix them together. 
     By adding a probabilistic language to Suzy’s actions we can make the conditional statement 
have relevance within the example layer and avoid any contradiction.  By this I mean it would 
make sense for an observer of Suzy in her layer to ask “What if Suzy missed?”  Here is an example.  
Billy and Suzy throw rocks at a window.  Suzy throws first.  Suzy has a 0.75 probability of 
shattering the window before Billy throws.  If Suzy’s rock didn’t shatter the window, Billy’s rock 
would have shattered the window.  In this thought experiment Suzy has 0.75 probability of 
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shattering the bottle and Billy has a 0.25 probability.  We know Billy’s probability because we 
demand that the bottle gets shattered in our thought experiment, so his probability is 1 - 0.75.  In 
this example it makes perfect sense to raise questions about Suzy acting one way or the other, but 
the world in not deterministic.  What happens in this example if we ask “What if Suzy had a 0.25 
probability of shattering the bottle?”  Of course you would reply that that would be a completely 
different thought experiment with different probabilities, and that you would not use conclusions 
from the second experiment to make conclusions about causation in the first.  However, this type of 
argument is made almost uniformly when talking about preemptive type causality examples.  
     Although we eliminate the host of problems that arise by assuming that Suzy indeterministically 
shattered the bottle, the force of this example of late preemption dissipates.  Further, the dilemma 
that the bottle must shatter at the end of the experiment remains.  Who is it that has the knowledge 
that the bottle must shatter?  Certainly this knowledge only exists in the actual layer where you and 
I suppose that it is true, for how could Billy or Suzy know this in advance?  But then the example is 
again ill-posed as it is not a self-contained set of premises.  Suppose I wished to know what would 
happen to the bottle if neither Billy nor Suzy shattered it.  This question has no answer in either 
layer.  Perhaps the bottle just shatters by itself when no one is around.  If I do not know what 
happens to the bottle when both Billy and Suzy are not influencing it, then how can I make any 
claim about causation?  In the above example our commonsense notion of causation fails.  While 
you may blame the probabilistic component, I believe that the remaining determinism is the source 
of confusion. 
     The forgoing argument has been focused on causation examples, how we analyze them, and the 
assumptions we make.  I have not claimed that any particular theory of causation is flawed; rather, 
the examples themselves are problematic.  From a pragmatic standpoint, why else would such a 
simple example of late preemption be so difficult to reconcile unless the problem was with the 
example and not the theory?   
 
VI. DETERMINISM 
     In the end, the fundamental flaw with this example of causation is the assumption that 
determinism holds and that the antecedent of the conditional situation has the possibly of being 
realized in the exact same world.  It is implied that we assume a deterministic example of causation 
when we describe an example without assigning chance to various events.  But determinism 
dictates that events can only happen in one way.  If you are observing Suzy shatter a window in the 
actual world, and you assume that the world is deterministic, then asking what would have 
happened had Suzy not shattered the window is irrelevant in the actual world because the situation 
you are inquiring about could never have happened.  Your inclination then is to ask what would 
have happened “in theory” if Suzy did not shatter the window.  In doing this you are imagining a 
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different deterministic world, a world in which Suzy in fact misses; a separate world where she 
could have done none other.  In both worlds Suzy’s actions are precisely dictated.   In the first 
world she was the cause; in the second she was not.  Neither world influences the other.  We can 
restate the problem in one more way: 
 
1H : ‘Suzy must shatter the window and Billy must not’ 
2H : ‘Suzy must not shatter the window and Billy must’  
 
The ‘must’ is added to emphasize determinism and implies nothing more.  These statements 
essentially summarize the example at hand after abandoning the conditional.  Since determinism 
holds, either  or  is true but not both.  With what likelihood are they true or not?  It appears 
that we implicitly assign a particular chance to each premise being true or not, at least in some 
sense, yet this probability is strictly outside of the original deterministic thought experiment.  We 
want to assume that determinism holds, yet we also want to assume that events have some chance 
of going a different way.  We have gotten around this in causation examples by making the world 
of the example deterministic, and then allocating the probability outside of the example so that we 
can meaningfully talk about deterministic events going one way or the other.  Instead of stating that 
Suzy has some probability of shattering the glass or not in a single consistent example, the example 
writer implies that one or the other deterministic worlds (  or ) is true or not with an 
unspecified probability.  I believe that the best anyone can say is that Suzy causes the window to 
shatter under   and Billy causes the window to shatter under .  We might add probabilities 
for which these are true, but at no time does this example create the confusion that has been 
traditionally associated with it.  The algebra example can be resolved in a similar manner. 
1H
H
2H
1H 2H
2H1
 
VII. A BLOCK SPACE-TIME DEFINITION – BILLY AND SUZY OBSERVED 
     Let us question once more what is meant by determinism in these examples.  A common 
definition states that a world is deterministic if and only if, given a specified state at time t, the way 
things go thereafter is fixed as a matter of natural law (Hoefer [2004]).  This is similar to the 
possible worlds definition given in the beginning of this paper.  It follows, if Billy and Suzy inhabit 
a world with determinism, then a given time t before they engage in rock throwing should 
sufficiently fix their future actions.  At no point could they have done otherwise.  Here we offer 
another definition of determinism that illustrates what is at stake.  This view of determinism is not 
new but only a re-specification of the block universe put forth by Einstein and Minkowski and 
argued against by William James (Einstein et al. [1952]).  We will say that world w is deterministic 
if and only if the world lines of all objects A in w are non-probabilistic (fixed) functions of space 
and time.  World w is not deterministic if one or more world lines in w are a probabilistic function 
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of space or time.  An object A is anything for which a space-time distance between A and an 
arbitrary space-time point P can be measured (baseballs, cars, and puddles count; the thought of a 
peach does not – although the originating neurons do).  By measure we mean in the empirical 
sense.  The position of an electron can be measured – but not with the unaided eye.  There is a 
healthy distinction to be made between objects such as shadows and those such as chairs which we 
will mention below (Dowe [1997]). 
     This view of determinism is best appreciated when considering the block space-time illustration 
in Figure 1. 3  Two spatial dimensions are represented by x1 and x2 and one of time by t.   Assume 
that there are two worlds, both consisting of only two particles A and B.  In the first world, the 
world line of each particle is fixed within the world.  In the second world, the A particle may be 
found on one of three world lines with a particular probability, where possible paths are represented 
by dashed lines.  The indeterminism may be spread across time or space or both.  We can imagine 
an arbitrary volume representing the indeterminate path of any object.   An electron would have a 
probabilistic path according to the Copenhagen interpretation of quantum physics.  This conception 
of determinism side-steps much confusion spawned by other definitions by considering block 
space-time.  Briefly, there is no need to consider a particular state of the universe at a given time t, 
and it becomes clear that determinism refers symmetrically to the arbitrary past and future.  Nor do 
we confuse prediction with determinism.  The world line of a particle may entail an incredibly 
Ax2 
tx1 
B
A deterministic world
Figure 1 
x2 A
tx1 
B
A non-deterministic world
                                                 
3  Our diagrams are not technically Minkowski space-time diagrams in that we do not assume that the Minkowski 
space-time metric holds.  This means that the world lines we draw will have arbitrary paths through space and time; 
paths which would not be possible according to our current understanding of our universe. 
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complicated path through space-time and be extremely difficult to predict given the history of the 
particle, but this would in no way imply indeterminism.  There is no need to assume that the laws 
of physics are identical in different regions of space-time.  So long as a particle is restricted to one 
path, it matters not what laws that particle experiences.  Finally, the formulation above is quite 
general and applies to all other possible worlds that exist in arbitrary n-dimensional space-time 
containing a well-defined measure of distance.    
     While this definition and its relation to previous definitions is a matter of debate; the block-
space time view of determinism is not new.   In accordance with commonsense, our definition 
makes a clear deterministic difference between classical and quantum physics under the 
Copenhagen interpretation.  The utility of our definition is in its ability to cleanly specify what we 
mean by a deterministic causation example, and to make clear the distinction we are to make from 
indeterminism.  Further, at no point do we need to consider the so-called prior causes 
deterministically causing everything else that is to follow.  All particles have their own path to 
follow in the universe, whether they run into other particles or not.  In a deterministic world that 
concerns itself with physical objects, causation appears to be no more than asking if two particles 
overlap or oppose each other in any region of space-time.  Under determinism, one kind of 
causation is identical to physical interaction – well, almost.  Those philosophers who concern 
themselves with causal process theory and more specifically the conserved quantity theorem have 
convincingly argued that under determinism in block space-time, one sort of causation is to be 
understood in terms of world lines and intersections of these lines accompanied by an exchange in 
conserved physical quantities (Dowe [1992]; Salmon [1994]). 
Glass 
Window 
x2 
Rock 
t 
x1 Suzy Rock 
Deterministic example of shattering 
Figure 2 
Glass 
Window 
x2 RockB
RockS
RockB
t Billy x1 
Suzy RockS 
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Marc Burock 
     Figure 2 is perhaps the clearest argument against the compatibility of a deterministic world and 
the traditional late preemptive examples; as well it shows that any complicated theory of causation 
under determinism is unnecessary to explain it – the conserved quantity theorem handles it neatly.  
Here we represent the world lines of a rock, Suzy, a window, and shattered glass.  I ignore Billy for 
now.  This is the world of the thought experiment viewed en-bloc through space and time.  At some 
time Suzy (the thick bottom world line) interacts with the rock; the interaction is represented by the 
intersection of their respective world lines. The rock flies off toward the stationary window and 
then interacts with the window.  The physical interaction of the rock and window results in glass 
fragments.  Intersecting world lines are called causal interactions, but it seems like calling them 
physical interactions would suffice.   Under determinism it makes no sense to ask what would have 
happened if Suzy missed.  She cannot do so.   
     In the bottom diagram we can ask intelligibly about alternative scenarios because the path of 
Suzy’s rock is not determined.  This is the example that I suspect all discussions in the literature are 
attempting to answer regarding the Billy and Suzy ‘late’ preemption example.  If I am wrong, then 
one should be able to represent this example in a single diagram without introducing any 
indeterminism.  This rendition of the example is clearly non-deterministic, which makes it an 
interesting example for causation analysis.  Here we assumed that the timing of shattering would 
have been identical for both throwers.  To assume different timing would require a completely 
different diagram.  We gave Billy’s rock a deterministic path because the example is often stated in 
such a way that his rock could do no other.  Suzy is often given the chance to miss, and so the path 
of her rock is indeterminate.  We could have made Billy’s rock path indeterminate as well; it does 
not change the argument.  In this example we require that the window is shattered 
deterministically.  We might ask, given that the window is shattered, who exactly is responsible for 
this outcome?  In our example the answer is at least Billy and perhaps both Billy and Suzy because 
we provided no additional information in which to differentiate them.  You could further 
complicate the example, and assume that Billy and Suzy shatter the glass in different ways, 
describing different numbers of glass fragments and velocities, but then you must create new 
indeterminate paths for the glass shattering.  Given that the glass shattered in a particular way 
(choosing one indeterminate path over another), you could trace the path back to the associated 
thrower by following the intersecting lines.  If you assume that shattering can take place in a 
number of different ways, you are adding more indeterminism to a so-called deterministic example.  
Some of the current theories of causation suggest that considering finer details regarding the 
shattering solves the example of late preemption (Lewis [2000]).  This is incorrect.  More detail 
simply adds more paths to the world line diagram.  It would be helpful to assign probabilities to 
make this example tractable. 
 
Determinism and Causation Examples 
VIII. CONCLUSIONS 
     Any question about causation that involves a deterministic world as described above, that does 
not allow for probabilistic alternatives, and concerns itself solely with objects carrying conserved 
physical quantities can be reduced to a world line diagram without any mystery.  No matter how 
complicated the example, should it include levers going on and off, preemptive potential causes, 
and double preventions; if the example mandates a deterministic world and conserved quantities, 
then it is solved easily – ignore all conditional statements and draw the diagram.  You can also 
appreciate that a sort of transitivity can be readily assigned in these examples.  If the rock 
interacted with Suzy, and the rock interacted with the window, then Suzy interacted with the 
window (through the rock).  Simply follow the intersecting world lines.  Space-time objects are 
connected through chains of symmetric interaction.  Interaction is transitive. 
     The mystery of causation is far from resolved, although for a class of causation problems 
involving determinism as defined above and concerning itself with conserved physical quantities, 
most of the ends are tied.  The late preemption example of Billy and Suzy either contains a 
contradiction in its assumptions or has a trivial solution; problematic examples do not likely end 
with those two.  All neural-type diagram examples are likewise physical, and if we ignore the 
conditionals there should be no confusion.  Even though we introduced a specific definition of 
determinism for clarity, it seems most common definitions lead to the same conclusions as our 
initial arguments did not depend upon this view.  The interesting questions regarding causation 
spring from two sources – indeterminism and objects not composed of fundamental particles.  
There is no single robust concept of indeterminate causation that coincides with commonsense and 
leads to acceptable results in all cases.  The second problem has been addressed in the casual 
process literature, at least for so-called pseudo processes like shadows, reflections, television 
images and other patterns of light.  However, focusing on these physical epi-objects seems to 
minimize the notion that thoughts, ideas, and states seem to be just as causative as more physical 
phenomena.  If our deterministic example considers events to be fact or ideas, I am far more 
intrigued.  Certainly I do not know what it means to draw the world line of a fact or an idea.  Can 
an idea interact with another idea or a physical object?  Ideas seem to pop into my mind from 
nowhere, interact with other ideas, influence my physical behavior, and then disappear – like these. 
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